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son in order to make room for faith. 
While I cannot agree with Hare's attempt to displace the line between 
faith and knowledge, he makes an impressive case for returning this issue, as 
well as the problem of the moral gap, and the question of the Christian roots 
of Kant's ethics to prominence in philosophical and theological discourse. 
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Analytic Theism, Hartshorne, and the Concept of God by Daniel A. 
Dombrowski. State University of New York Press, 1996. Pp. xi, 247. 
SEAMUS MURPHY, Milltown Institute of Theology and Philosophy 
Process philosophy's approach to issues concerning the existence and 
nature of God has not gained much acceptance from analytic theist philoso-
phers. Daniel Dombrowski's book should go a considerable way towards 
generating more interest among analytic philosophers and, hopefully, recti-
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tying that neglect. Taking the concept of God as the focal point, the author 
presents Hartshorne's development of it in ways that are engagingly 
addressed to the concerns and intuitions of classical and analytic philosoph-
ical theism. The author achieves his goal in large measure: at least, he has 
made this reviewer more sympathetic to the process approach to God. 
Dombrowski draws attention to the fact that, while the debates concern-
ing the existence of God and the epistemological possibilities of reasoning 
to it have been long and extensive, little attention has been paid to the 
importance of conceptual issues concerning the nature of God. While there 
was a period earlier in this century when positivistic emphasis on the veri-
fiability criterion led to a debate as to whether words such as "God" could 
have any meaning at all, that phase appears to be largely over, as a result 
of its becoming apparent that the great bulk of our theoretic concepts 
would also be jeopardized by that line of thought. Hartshorne's focus on 
the concept of God has been to a different and more fruitful end. 
As Dombrowski notes, the concept of God can be seen to be central to 
the epistemological debates: determining whether God exists will typically 
be affected by one's notion of what it is whose existence is in question. An 
impassible and unchanging creator must, by virtue of those qualities, be 
unrelated (except in an external, residual way) to his creatures. While 
there are cogent philosophical reasons for holding such a concept of God, it 
fits badly with the image presented in Judeo-Christian-Islamic revelation. 
Monotheism presents God as intimately involved in human history, loving 
all he has created, treating his rational creatures as free moral agents with a 
capacity for knowledge of and perhaps friendship with their creator, and 
hating evil and injustice. 
In addition, the concept of an impassible God presents epistemological 
difficulties: if one can't be related to God, so much the harder to claim even 
the minimal involvement of knowing or being able to know that he exists. 
The process approach makes it easier to make sense of the religious claim 
that God's nature is partly relational and that in a certain sense God can 
even be said to need us. While process philosophy is not beyond challenge, 
it does have some strong cards to play in these areas. At the outset (pp. 8-
9), the reader is introduced to Hartshorne's matrix of possible positions 
with respect to God and the world being respectively necessary or contin-
gent. Hartshorne's own position was that both necessity and contingency 
are predicable of God and of the world. The claim that God, whose exis-
tence and most of whose properties are necessary, may have some contin-
gent qualities is not unattractive since it accommodates the idea that God 
can and does relate to us. The author deals with the reasons for rejecting 
classical theism's view that God is not in any respect contingent, and shows 
the desirability of ascribing certain attributes to God (such as the ability to 
develop through relationship) which, while at variance with monotheism's 
traditional view, we would find admirable in human beings. 
On the other hand, the claim that the world is non-contingent in certain 
respects is less attractive, since it removes God's freedom as regards choos-
ing whether to create. This can perhaps be more accurately understood as 
simply the claim that God's existence as cause makes a world of some sort 
inevitable or necessary. However, the claim that some world necessarily 
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exists does not entail the proposition that this world necessarily exists. It 
was disappointing that the author did not clarify Hartshorne's reasons for 
holding that this world must in some sense be necessary. The more attrac-
tive position where God is both necessary and contingent, and the world 
purely contingent, is apparently not acceptable to Hartshorne and his fol-
lowers, yet no reasons are given for not adopting it. 
The first three chapters in this book are the most important, dealing 
respectively with divine immutability, the commitments of Hartshornian 
dipolar theism, and divine embodiment. As regards the first of these, the 
classical assumption that it is better (or more perfect) to be unchanging 
rather than developing, emotionally unaffected than experiencing emotion, 
self-sufficient rather than related and hence dependent, is shown for what 
it is: an assumption, with limited justification. Given the fact that our lan-
guage about God is inevitably anthropomorphic to some extent, so that the 
admirable or perfect qualities of God are human characteristics extrapolat-
ed ad infinitum and projected onto the divine, it seems reasonable enough 
to suggest that they should be seen as context-dependent. Self-sufficiencey 
is admirable in some contexts and not in others. In certain contexts, recep-
tivity and sensitivity can surely be good-making or admirable qualities, 
just as much as steadfastness and endurance in other contexts. While 
receptivity and sympathy appear to make God contingent in certain 
respects, there are good grounds for accepting this contingency as an 
enrichment of our concept of God, a 'magnification' of the Lord. 
Introducing contingency and relationality (to created reality) into God will 
produce as well as solve philosophical problems; but every philosophical 
option has some drawbacks. 
Dombrowski does a good job of surveying the relevant literature for 
comparative purposes, and of drawing together the main points in ways 
that are helpful and informative. Thus, the views of Swinburne, Plantinga, 
Alston, Creel, Gunton and others are discussed in ways that indicate the 
different positions it is possible to hold on these matters. Making God con-
tingent in certain respects is entailed in holding that God is affected sym-
pathetically by his creatures, but this does not imply that God is in any 
way inferior to anything or anybody else, or surpassable by anything other 
than himself. The Hartshornian idea is that divine becoming can be more 
inclusive, more all-embracing than divine being. 
Chapter two, where the issue is whether Hartshorne's process philoso-
phy can achieve a balance between God as active and God as receptive, 
contains important material. In particular, he uses Plato's remark in the 
Sophist (247e) that to be real is to have power, and to have power is to be 
able to affect other things or be affected by them. If the disjunctive 'or' is 
taken in an inclusive sense, it can be argued that part of the fullness of 
being is to be receptive and capable of being influenced. There is a serious 
question as to whether viewing God as a non-relational being does not, so 
to speak, lessen God's fullness. One outcome of the process view is a more 
favourable attitude to the idea that God acts by persuasion rather than by 
compulsion. Critics tend to assume that this denies efficient causality to 
God, with final causality masquerading as efficient causality. This too is 
dealt with in an interesting way. 
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The next chapter turns to the question of whether and in what sense God 
can be said to be embodied, and uses the views of Swinburne for compari-
son. It is an enlightening treatment of a complex topic in a brief space. The 
roots of Hartshorne's views are traced back to Plato, where the idea of God 
as the World-Soul is first developed. The discussion of this point, making 
clear how important Plato is to the process view of God, is stimulating. 
Connections are also traced to figures such as Plotinus and Origen, and 
similarities to some of Leibniz's ideas are also noted. 
Hartshorne's panentheism commits him to the position that the world is 
in some sense a part of God. One reason for holding this is to render 
coherent the religious claim that God knows us, our world and our 
predicament. Since these are contingent realities, and since knowledge 
must be internal to the knower, that would make something contingent 
internal to God. The arguments in support are presented clearly. 
Objections to the claim that immateriality is entailed in perfection are treat-
ed at some length. 
The claim that there must be a world if God is to be omnibenevolent was 
not supported to any great extent; Swinburne's point that there is no over-
riding reason for God to make a universe is dismissed a little too quickly. 
The assumption that God cannot be relational unless there is a material 
universe with embodied beings for him to relate to seems forced; and the 
brief remark (p. 89) in this context about the doctrine of the Trinity does 
not do it justice, philosophically or theologically. In addition, the claim 
that God's creation is not ex nihilo is an important point of difficulty which 
should have been discussed. Chapters 4 and 5 are less important, since 
they focus more on the views of other writers, such as William Alston, for 
purposes of comparison to the process approach. 
The final chapter, considering the implications of a process concept of 
God for moral issues, was the weakest and least convincing. In the case of 
abortion, I doubt if the classical (non-process) notion of God is a significant 
causal factor leading Uto a misguided opposition to the moral permissibili-
ty of abortion" (p.6). In general, people's moral intuitions are rarely deter-
mined by their concept of God. In this instance, causal influence (if any) is 
much more likely to run in the opposite direction, since people feel far 
more passionately about the right to choose or the right to life than they do 
about the appropriate concept of God. 
Perhaps the value of the author's discussion of abortion is that it raises 
questions about process philosophy's concept of personal beinK and identi-
ty; there seemed to be weaknesses on this point that were not apparent in 
earlier chapters. The beauty of the Hartshornian concept of God was that it 
seemed broad enough to be able to accommodate our intuitions about both 
the substance and the process dimensions of God's being. Something simi-
lar is needed as regards the story of what it is to be a human being before 
the insights of process theism can be applied to ethical theory. In addition, 
the notion of process needs further clarification. While some processes are 
simply processual, like the process of going bald, others are such that they 
embed a determining event, e.g. the process of becoming pregnant. Any 
application of process theism to issues of being a person or having person-
al identity, as well as to ethical issues, must deal with the latter kind of 
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process. Ethical theory in particular cannot lightly take it that the notion of 
process can replace the notions of event and act. 
Reflections in the Mirror of Religion, by Ninian Smart. Edited by John P. 
Burris. Macmillan/St. Martin's Press, 1997. Pp. xiii and 237. Cloth $45.00. 
CHRISTOPHER KEY CHAPPLE, Loyola Marymount University 
This work gathers several essays written and published by Ninian Smart 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Ninian Smart, the 1998 President of 
the American Academy of Religion, helped establish two premier depart-
ments of Religious Studies, at the University of Lancaster in England and at 
the University of California, Santa Barbara. These essays contain reflections 
on four decades of Smart's study and teaching of world religious traditions. 
The editor, John Burris, has grouped these essays into three categories. 
The first several essays probe the great metaphysical questions that under-
gird the study of world religions. What is the nature of religious experi-
ence? Can an experience of pure consciousness be achieved? Does the 
mystic enter into a realm held in common with members of other faith tra-
ditions? The second group of essays explores the sociology of religion in 
India and China for the past two hundred years. Smart discusses the dif-
ferences between the South Asian and East Asian responses to colonialism 
and seeks to explain the unqiue pespective of Theravada Buddhism, partic-
ularly in Sri Lanka. In the third and final section of the book, Smart exam-
ines practical issues pertaining to the study of religion at both the under-
graduate and graduate levels, and ends on the optimistic note that interre-
ligious understanding will help promote world peace. 
Smart's philosophical approach to the study of religion might be charac-
terized as liberal, open-minded, optimistic, pragmatic, and somewhat 
perennialist. Though Smart has for decades worked at a full articulation of 
the geographic and historical distinctions that set religious traditions apart 
from one another, his analysis discerns two primary modalities of religious 
thought. The first, and more common, asserts a transcendent presence that 
determines and shapes the course of human life, at least in matters of ulti-
mate concern. The Abrahamic Monotheisms Gudaism, Christianity, Islam) 
fit this typology, as do Hinduism and certain strands of East Asian 
thought, particularly as found in the moral absolutism of the Confucian 
tradition and the cosmic Buddhahood of the Mahayana. However, accord-
ing to Smart, Theravada Buddhism, with its negation of an abiding soul, 
puts forth a model of religiosity that requires its own category. While not 
exactly nihilistic, the Theravada nonetheless shows no interest in the per-
vasive theological concerns of the other traditions. By focussing on the 
heroic control of the mind through ethical observances and meditation, 
Theravada remains a reluctant partner for dialogue with other faiths 
because of its reluctance to name as deity its concept of transcendence. 
In discussing religion and modernity, Smart compares and contrasts 
Maoist Marxism (which he considers to be religious) with the Neo-
